The D.C. Circuit, in what is evidently an issue of first impression, ruled in favor of a federal employee in the following situation: (1) employee files an internal EEO complaint, and the agency rules in the employee’s favor on some but not all issues; (2) agency orders some relief on the successful issues; (3) employee then files a civil action in the district court on the issues that she lost at the agency level; (4) the government seeks to dismiss the case on the grounds that the employee did not seek judicial review of her entire agency-level complaint. The district court (Judge Kollar-Kotelly) agreed with the government that the case had to be dismissed on that ground. The D.C. Circuit reversed.
The D.C. Circuit squarely rejected the government’s assertion that the civil action had to encompass the employee’s entire EEO complaint, not just the issues that she lost at the agency level – in other words, the government wanted de novo review of the entire EEO complaint, so that seeking an appeal as to the lost issues would foreclose any obligation by the agency to comply with the relief awarded by the EEOC Administrative Judge on the successful issues.
The court also rejected the government’s contention that a contrary result might lead to litigation tactics in which the government would never grant partial relief on an EEO complaint.
Some excerpts follow:
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/201009/09-5291-1264254.pdf
Payne v. Salazar (Secretary, Dept. of the Interior), No. 09-5291 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 7, 2010)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:08-cv-00164)
David A. Branch argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Christian A. Natiello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.
Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.
GARLAND, Circuit Judge:
This case raises an important and largely undecided issue under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The government contends that a federal employee who wins one Title VII claim before her agency, but loses another, must put the first at risk in order to seek relief on the second in federal court. Finding no basis for the government’s interpretation of the statute, we reject that contention. . . .
. . . . In September 2004, Payne filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint with the Interior Department alleging religious discrimination. Later in September, Payne alleges, her supervisor retaliated against her for filing the EEO complaint by giving her a minute-by-minute work schedule, forbidding her to have breakfast with co-workers, and denying her leave. Based on that allegation, Payne filed a retaliation complaint, which the Department consolidated with her discrimination complaint.
On September 18, 2007, an EEOC administrative judge found that the Interior Department had discriminated against Payne on account of her religion. The administrative judge also found, however, that the Department had not retaliated against her for filing a complaint. In October 2007, the judge entered an order for monetary damages on the discrimination charge, which the Department paid in December 2007.
In January 2008, Payne filed suit in district court alleging a single claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), based on the same retaliatory conduct initially alleged in her 2004 EEO complaint. In July 2008, Payne amended her suit to add a second retaliation claim based on the Interior Department’s refusal in January 2008 to assign her light-duty work after she returned from an extended medical leave for a bad back. On June 22, 2009, the district court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss Payne’s suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Payne v. Salazar, 628 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (D.D.C. 2009).
The court dismissed Payne’s first retaliation claim on the ground that she did not also sue on the discrimination claim she had won before the EEOC administrative judge. According to the court, “a federal employee who obtains a final administrative disposition that finds discrimination . . . as to a portion of the allegations in the EEO Complaint, may [not] challenge in federal court just those liability findings by the EEOC that are unfavorable to the employee . . . while preserving those liability findings that are favorable to her.” Id. at 45-46. Because Payne sought review only of the claim she lost before the administrative judge, the court dismissed her suit for “failure to state a claim.” Id. at 52. . . .
. . . . The government is correct that “the language in the statute explicitly states that it is the final disposition of the complaint that is actionable; not of the individual claims therein.” Appellee’s Br. 7. But this only means that the employee cannot sue until the agency takes final action on all of the claims contained in her administrative complaint. Cf. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (authorizing judicial review of “final agency action”); 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (authorizing appellate review of “final decisions of the district courts”). Section
2000e-16(c) does not say that, once the agency has finally disposed of the complaint, the employee must then file that same “complaint” in court. Instead, it says that she may then file a “civil action.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “govern the procedure in all civil actions” in federal district courts. FED R. CIV. P. 1. Federal Rule 2 states that there is only “one form of action – the civil action,” and Rule 3 provides that a “civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Rule 8 -- which governs the content of such a complaint -- requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Nothing in the Federal Rules suggests that the “complaint” filed in federal court must include all the claims the plaintiff previously raised in a complaint she filed with her agency -- let alone those that were satisfactorily resolved in her favor. Indeed, a complaint filed in federal court cannot include the latter because “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press,” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006), and standing requires that the plaintiff “suffered an ‘injury in fact,’” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
Notwithstanding the way in which the government has framed the issue, it is not really arguing that an employee’s civil action must include a claim as to which she does not believe herself aggrieved. Rather, the government is effectively arguing that, if the employee wants relief on a claim she lost below, she must permit the agency to withdraw its final action on the claim she won, requiring her to prove it again in court. See Appellee’s Br. 15 (“Payne could bring her retaliation claim if she also br[ings] her discrimination claim and returns the award that was already recompensed to her as a result of her EEO complaint.”). But there is nothing in the statute upon which the government can hang such a construction. To the contrary, section 2000e-16(c) authorizes the employee to file in federal court after “final action taken by a department [or] agency.” Nothing in the statutory language renders such “final” agency action nonfinal merely because the employee files a civil action.
. . . . In sum, an employee’s right to trial de novo -- whether her employer is the federal government or a private company -- means that she is entitled to a plenary trial of whatever claims she brings to court. It does not mean that she must sue on claims she has no interest in pursuing. Indeed, were we to impose such a requirement, we would ourselves be treating federal employees differently than private-sector employees. After all, Title VII does not require a private-sector employee, who complains to her employer about two acts of discrimination but receives voluntary recompense for (only) one, to sue on both claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (authorizing private-sector employees to bring civil actions for violations of Title VII).
. . . . Finally, the government warns that, “[s]hould this Court accept [a]ppellant’s position and allow administrative complainants to advance only the claims they find unfavorable, a serious chilling effect on the government’s ratifying of adverse administrative findings could result.” Appellee’s Br. 15 n.5. If the “agency believes it is liable on one claim, but not the other,” the government posits, “[w]hy would it rule in complainant’s favor on the one claim for which it believes it is liable if it will be precluded from challenging that finding in federal court?” Id.
The government can find the answer to its question in the inscription outside the Attorney General’s Office at the Department of Justice: “The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The same is true of justice done its employees in the agencies. If an agency “believes it is liable” on a claim, Title VII requires it to rule in the complainant’s favor without regard to tactical litigation considerations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(e) (declaring that “[n]othing contained in this Act shall relieve any Government agency or official of its or his primary responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment”).