D.C. Court of Appeals, en banc workers comp decision

Sometimes employment discrimination plaintiffs will also try to bring workers compensation claims, arguing that they suffered medical/physical injuries as a result of the workplace stress. The employer may try to argue that the employee's pre-existing medical conditions caused the injuries, and that the employer should not be responsible for any aggravation of the pre-existing conditions. The D.C. Court of Appeals, in its prior decisions, has created a somewhat muddled set of precedent in this area.

Today (May 15), the D.C. Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, unanimously held that whether a workers' comp claimant had pre-existing medical conditions is not a bar to a workers comp claim based on an allegation that workplace conditions aggravated or exacerbated those pre-existing conditions.

The court applies this to both private sector and D.C. government employee workers comp claims.

Here, the claimant had, years ago, received mental health care to deal with the stress of her father's death, since he had been committed to mental institutions for a number of years. However, while working for the DC Public Schools, she did not require treatment, until after she suffered some physical injuries in the workplace upon which her mental condition significantly worsened.

Some excerpts follow:

http://www.dcappeals.gov/dccourts/appeals/pdf/04-AA-211.PDF

No. 04-AA-211

CHARLENE MCCAMEY, PETITIONER, V.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, RESPONDENT.

Petition for Review of a Decision of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services (Dir. Dkt. No. 10-03)

(Argued en banc November 30, 2006 Decided May 15, 2008 )

Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, and FARRELL, RUIZ, REID, GLICKMAN, KRAMER, FISHER, BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, and THOMPSON, Associate Judges.

WASHINGTON, Chief Judge:

Charlene McCamey petitioned this court to review a decision of the Director of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services (D.C. DOES) that denied her workers' compensation claim for psychological injuries she alleges resulted from an accidental physical injury suffered in the course of her employment. A three-judge division of this court affirmed the Director's decision, holding that the Director's application of an objective test to workers' compensation claims involving psychological injuries was consistent with this court's prior decisions. We granted Ms. McCamey's petition for rehearing en banc to consider whether application of an objective standard, as currently defined, to psychological injuries that are related to work-related physical injuries is consistent with the language and purpose of our workers' compensation law. We conclude that it is not and accordingly must reverse.

. . . At issue in this case is Ms. McCamey's claim for temporary total disability benefits arising from the psychological injuries that she attributes to her workplace accident. Dr. Hammill, the treating psychiatrist, was of the opinion that the workplace incident exacerbated Ms. McCamey's pre-existing psychological disorder. Dr. Bruce Smoller, a psychiatrist who examined Ms. McCamey on behalf of DCPS, and who relied in part on an MRI scan of Ms. McCamey's brain and on thyroid tests, opined that the source of Ms. McCamey's psychological injury was not her accident, but rather a pre-existing psychosis. In a "Recommended Compensation Order" entered on April 22, 2003, the ALJ denied Ms. McCamey's claim for psychological injury. . . .

. . . We are now presented with that opportunity. In light of the humanitarian nature of the statute, we hold, in cases involving physical-mental claims, that the objective test is inconsistent with the statute's principal purpose of compensating employees who prove a connection between a disability and their work. Accordingly, its use must be overturned. Further, just as the aggravation rule in purely physical claims stems from the general principle that an employer must take an employee as it finds him or her, so too should the aggravation rule apply in physical-mental claims without requiring the employee to point to a hypothetical third person - an additional, heightened burden that is necessarily speculative and unnecessary within the context of physical-mental claims where the work-related cause is distinct. Alternatively, if the psychological injury is tied not to the work-related accident, but rather a physical injury that itself arose from the work-related accident, the reviewing body could analyze it as a subsequently occurring injury that could be causally tied to the injury sustained in the workplace accident. Once complainant has established a compensable primary injury (either through the presumption or testimony), the necessary causal connection standard is enunciated in Brown, supra, 700 A.2d at 791-92.

. . . The objective test as applied cannot be reconciled with the clear language of either the WCA or the CMPA, both of which provide in straightforward language that the Acts compensate workers for injuries they suffer on the job. The WCA covers "[t]he injury or death of an employee that occurs in the District of Columbia if the employee performed work for the employer, at the time of the injury or death, while in the District of Columbia," D.C. Code § 32-1503 (a)(1), while the CMPA covers "the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of his or her duty," D.C. Code § 1-623.02. Further, the test as applied fails to meet the humanitarian purpose of the statute, it neglects to award compensation in arguable cases, and it is contrary to the aggravation rule and the general principle that employers must accept employees as they find them. Moreover, as demonstrated above, it is simply unnecessary in physical-mental cases because the accident supplies the necessary objective work connection. Accordingly, the test must be overturned.

Though the workplace accident supplies the necessary and objective workplace connection, the claimant must still ultimately prove that his or her disability is causally connected to that accident. While a review of decisions from other jurisdictions reveals different terminology for defining causation in this context, those jurisdictions do not offer any particular reason for adopting any particular test (e.g., "but for," "causative factor," "directly traceable"). Thus, we hold that it is appropriate to apply the causal standards seen throughout D.C. workers' compensation cases. In cases where the statutory presumption is applicable, the claimant must show that the physical accident had the potential of resulting in or contributing to the psychological injury.