In a decision of somewhat narrow applicability, but still of value, the Supreme Court held that in a fee petition under the federal Equal Access to Justice Act, the costs of paralegals can be recovered at market rates, not at their actual hourly salary. This reverses a decision of the Federal Circuit, which held that under the EAJA, only attorneys, experts, and agents could be compensated at market rates.
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1717.pdfRICHLIN SECURITY SERVICE CO. v. CHERTOFF, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
No. 06-1717. Argued March 19, 2008-Decided June 2, 2008
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U. S. C. §504(a)(l) (2006 ed.) and 28 U. S. C. §2412(d)(1)(A) (2000 ed.), allows a prevailing party in a case brought by or against the Government to recover fees for paralegal services at the market rate for such services or only at their cost to the party's attorney. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit limited recovery to the attorney's cost. 472 F. 3d 1370 (2006). We reverse.
. . . . To the extent that some ambiguity subsists in the statutory text, we need not look far to resolve it, for we have already addressed a similar question with respect to another fee-shifting statute. In Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U. S. 274 (1989), we considered whether litigants could recover paralegal fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. §1988. Section 1988 provides that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." We concluded that the term "attorney's fee" in §1988 "cannot have been meant to compensate only work performed personally by members of the bar." 491 U. S., at 285. Although separate billing for paralegals had become "increasingly widespread," id., at 286 (internal quotation marks omitted), attorney's fees had traditionally subsumed both the attorney's personal labor and the labor of paralegals and other individuals who contributed to the attorney's work product, see id., at 285. We were so confident that Congress had given the term "attorney's fees" this traditional gloss that we declared it "self-evident" that the term embraced the fees of paralegals as well as attorneys. Ibid.
We think Jenkins substantially answers the question before us. EAJA, like §1988, entitles certain parties to recover "reasonable attorney . . . fees." 5 U. S. C. §504(b)(1)(A). EAJA, like §1988, makes no mention of the paralegals, "secretaries, messengers, librarians, janitors, and others whose labor contributes to the work product for which an attorney bills her client." Jenkins, supra, at 285. And we think EAJA, like §1988, must be interpreted as using the term "attorney . . . fees" to reach fees for paralegal services as well as compensation for the attorney's personal labor. The Government does not contend that the meaning of the term "attorney's fees" changed so much between §1988's enactment in 1976 and EAJA's enactment in 1980 that the term's meaning in one statute must be different from its meaning in the other. Under the reasoning of Jenkins, we take it as "self-evident" that when Congress instructed agencies to award "attorney . . . fees" to certain parties prevailing against the Government, that term was intended to embrace paralegal fees as well. Since §504 generally provides for recovery of attorney's fees at "prevailing market rates," it follows that fees for paralegal services must be recoverable at prevailing market rates as well.
Alan R. Kabat (Bernabei & Wachtel, PLLC)
Comments