In an employment-related decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia held last week that while the Virginia arbitration statute does allow for appeals of orders denying motions to compel arbitration, the statute does not comparably provide for an appeal of an order granting a motion to compel arbitration. In other words, if one party (here, the employer) successfully moves to compel arbitration, the other party has to go forward with the arbitration and then if the outcome is adverse, petition for review by the circuit court after the completion of the arbitration.
Some excerpts follow:
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1080217.pdf
Present: Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., and Carrico, S.J.
CRISELL SEGUIN v. NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORPORATION, ET AL.
OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
Record No. 080217
February 27, 2009
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
This appeal arises from the circuit court’s order compelling arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act, Code § 8.01-581.01 et seq. The dispositive issue in this case is whether the Act provides a right to appeal from an order that compels arbitration.
BACKGROUND
During the course of Crisell Seguin’s employment, Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation sent unilateral e-mails and memoranda advising its employees that continued employment signified agreement to the new arbitration requirements of the company’s Dispute Resolution Process. After receiving these emails and memoranda, Seguin continued in her employment at Northrop Grumman, but never signed an arbitration agreement. Seguin subsequently filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County alleging that Northrop Grumman, and her supervisor, John C. Gage, (collectively, "Northrop Grumman") had defamed her by making false statements in her work performance evaluation. Northrop Grumman filed a motion to compel arbitration, contending that Seguin’s claim was covered by the company’s dispute resolution procedure requiring binding arbitration.
. . . Pursuant to Code § 8.01-581.016:
An appeal may be taken from: (1) An order denying an application to compel arbitration . . . (2) An order granting an application to stay arbitration . . . (3) An order confirming or denying an award; (4) An order modifying or correcting an award; (5) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or (6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this article.
Code § 8.01-581.016 does not grant a right to appeal an order granting an application to compel arbitration. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous.
. . . Seguin’s reliance on Amchem to support her contention that there is a right to appeal from an order that compels arbitration is misplaced. That case involved an appeal from a circuit court’s order denying an application to compel arbitration. Under Code § 8.01-581.016, the General Assembly expressly created a right to appeal from such an order. The Court’s statement in Amchem that "Code § 8.01-581.016 confers upon this Court jurisdiction to review a circuit court’s order that denies or compels arbitration" is dictum in so far as the statement includes the phrase "or compels." Id. at 96, 563 S.E.2d at 742-43. In no way does the Court’s prior decision in Amchem circumvent the lack of an express right under Code § 8.01-581.016 to an appeal from an order compelling arbitration.
[Alan R. Kabat, Bernabei & Wachtel, PLLC]
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