Supreme Court grants cert in 2 employment cases
Today (Jan. 18, 2008), the US Supreme Court granted cert in two employment discrimination cases, presumably to be heard in April.
(1) Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab, No. 06-1505. This age discrimination case, originating in the Northern District of New York, has already resulted in two Second Circuit decisions. 461 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2006); 381 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001). Although 2 issues were presented for review, the Supreme Court only granted cert on the first issue, which asks who has the burden in disparate impact age discrimination cases, in light of Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), of proving that the adverse action was taken for a valid reason other than age.
The Solicitor General, joined by the EEOC, recommended that cert be granted, but only as to the first question, and the Supreme Court agreed, thus leaving the second question for another day.
Here are the questions presented:
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits employment practices that have an unjustified disparate impact on older workers, Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), but also provides that it "shall not be unlawful for an employer * * * to take any action otherwise prohibited * * * where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C. 623(f)(1). The questions presented are:
1. Whether an employee alleging disparate impact under the ADEA bears the burden of persuasion in establishing "reasonable factors other than age."
2. Whether an employer's practice of conferring broad discretionary authority upon individual managers to decide which employees to lay off during a reduction in force constitutes a "reasonable factor other than age."
(2) Crawford v. Metropolitan Govt. of Nashville, No. 06-1595. This case, originating from the Sixth Circuit, 211 Fed. Appx. 373 (6th Cir. 2006), concerns whether an employee's statements as a witness in an internal investigation can be protected conduct under the retaliation statutes. Again, the Solicitor General, joined by the EEOC, recommended that cert be granted. The Sixth Circuit had held that the plaintiff's conduct was not protected under either the opposition clause or the participation clause of the retaliation statute.
The Solicitor's brief has a good summary:
Petitioner's disclosure of discriminatory acts during respondent's internal investigation into possible sexual harassment in the workplace was protected activity under Section 704(a). The court of appeals therefore erred in holding that neither clause of Section 704(a) protected petitioner. The court of appeals' construction of Section 704(a) creates an unjustified gap in Title VII's protection against retaliation. Internal investigations are an integral aspect of Title VII and there is no reason to leave cooperating witnesses unprotected. The Sixth Circuit's rule is not only at odds with the text of Section 704(a) but with its object and the EEOC's guidance materials.
The court of appeals' decision is out of step with the precedent in other circuits, but does not squarely conflict with other circuit precedents. Nevertheless, even in the absence of a square conflict, the question presented is of sufficient importance to the effective enforcement of Title VII to warrant resolution by this Court. In particular, the court of appeals' failure to protect employees in internal investigations that precede formal complaints raises significant concerns in light of this Court's decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999), which impose an affirmative duty on employers routinely to investigate allegations of sexual harassment to avoid liability or limit damages under Title VII.
Alan Kabat